The entry of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement has seen the developing countries and the least developed countries (LDCs) suffer from the excessive burden of obligations imposed under the Agreement to embrace and implement a higher standard of intellectual property (IP) protection. One of the areas where the impact of the measures is most felt is on accessibility to affordable medicines for frontline treatment of diseases in developing countries and LDCs, where the majority of the HIV/AIDS sufferers come from. This inevitable plight, although well known, and posited by the developing countries and LDCs during the Uruguay round of negotiations, was overlooked. This also necessitated the Doha Deceleration, which does not seem to have addressed the problem. The developed countries have also successfully utilised the TRIPS Agreement's IP rights protection criteria as a benchmark, to develop a much higher IP rights protection agenda through the introduction of TRIPS-plus provisions in bilateral and other multilateral agreements entered into with developing countries. The winners in the game are the patent-holding pharmaceutical corporations, software corporations, media corporations, and the developed countries where they are incorporated. The ones at the receiving end are the developing countries and the LDCs who were promised technology transfer to build a modern economy by the developed countries, but are faced with multiple problems of non-availability of affordable medicines for health care, besides others. This article seeks to study the justification for an extended IP rights protection under the TRIPS Agreement through an analysis of the philosophical underpinnings of the IP rights and the patent regime. It will be argued that the TRIPS Agreement is a major obstacle that the developing countries and the LDCs have been made to face as Members of the WTO (World Trade Organisation), with no end in sight for their miseries, and that the only possible solution is a review or an amendment of the TRIPS Agreement.
Part 1 1.Introduction: TRIPS Agreement
The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement was introduced through the World Trade Organization (WTO) in January 1995. The TRIPS Agreement is viewed as the most important instrument in the vision for a global governance of intellectual property (IP) rights protection, and is one of the most controversial agreements of the multilateral trading system. The expansion of international IP rights protection through the TRIPS Agreement has presented the developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs) with hitherto unknown challenges in various fields, including health care and agriculture. The introduction of the Agreement has witnessed an exponential price rise of life-saving drugs and has created barriers in the access to affordable medicines in developing countries and LDCs. This price rise has also severely impacted on national commitments to health care and other welfare programmes. The flexibilities contained in the TRIPS Agreement have not been fully utilised by the developing countries and LDCs due to a number of reasons. In some cases lobbying by transnational pharmaceutical corporations and political reasons had caused the delays in the implementation, and in some other cases the introduction of TRIPS-plus provisions in Free-Trade Agreements (FTAs) by developed countries had thwarted the introduction of such flexibilities.
The TRIPS Agreement, which has far-reaching implications on international IP rights protection, was drafted at the behest of patent right holders and strongly backed by developed countries. 1 The Agreement sets a minimum standard for the protection of IP rights and obligates both developed and developing country Member States to grant product patents for a period of 20 years in all fields of technology, including pharmaceutical patents.
2 It requires all Member States to comply with pre-existing international agreements on IP, 3 and also to afford equal treatment to citizens of all other Member States. 4 The Agreement, to ensure effective protection to both domestic and international patent holders' rights, requires all Member States to establish enforcement mechanisms both domestically and at their national borders. 5 The WTO Member States are also obligated to introduce domestic IP laws establishing minimum levels of protection for the IP rights identified in the Agreement, subject to transitional arrangements. 6 In effect, the Agreement has globalised IP rights, despite the profound asymmetries existing among WTO Member States in their levels of scientific and technological development. 7 The Agreement expressly addresses private rights of economic operators (IP rights holders), unlike the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and other WTO agreements, which formally grant rights to Member States and only address rights of traders indirectly. 8 While the Agreement creates new rights for producers of IP, and obligations for the users and consumers, it will see the price of essential drugs rise exponentially and if there was a level playing field in the negotiations when many member countries did not even have elementary levels of IP standards due to weaknesses in the national economy, knowledge economy, and infrastructure. This article is divided into four parts, with the first part presenting the introduction to the TRIPS Agreement and the premise of the current research, while the second part providing the background to the entry of international IP rights enforcement into the WTO through extensive lobbying from pharmaceutical patent holders from developed countries, which was ably supported by the music and motion picture industry and the software industry, to move the administration of IP rights enforcement from the WIPO to the WTO. The discussions will include the failed attempts of the developing countries and LDCs to prevent the introduction of international IP right protection as a covered agreement under the WTO, and the measures taken to introduce TRIPS flexibilities and the passing of the Doha Declaration.
The second part will also briefly outline the background to the introduction of IP rights in the former colonies during the colonial era, which largely facilitated the implementation of an expanded IP rights regime through the TRIPS Agreement. The third part will analyse the emergence of IP rights and the legal justification in the seventeenth century, the philosophical and legal basis of modern IP rights under the economic law principles to argue that it benefits only a handful of rights-holding developed Member States of the WTO, while depriving the non-rights-holding Member States of any benefits. The third part will also closely analyse the TRIPS Agreement from a human rights perspective, and its impact on access to medicines in developing countries and LDCs. It will be argued that the international IP rights protection regime, as it stands today, does not benefit and cannot benefit the developing countries and the LDCs, that it is primarily designed to benefit the rights holders and not the end users in developing countries and LDCs as it comes at a very high premium, and that any potential benefits to be derived from the regime is too onerous. The fourth part will discuss the findings and conclude, making suggestions as a way forward for the WTO community, including a complete rethink of the TRIPS Agreement, if not, a comprehensive review.
Part 2 2.1. Forum shifting: inclusion of IP rights protection in the WTO
The vision for an international IP rights protection was initially conceived and promoted by patent rights-holding transnational corporations from developed countries, which had campaigned relentlessly for the inclusion of an agreement on IP rights in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 18 It was claimed by US industries, which included pharmaceutical corporations, that they suffered heavy losses from the absence of adequate protection of their IP rights in foreign markets. 19 A strong view exists among writers, that some 12 US corporations were primarily responsible for the lobbying that brought the TRIPS Agreement into existence. 20 The TRIPS Agreement came to be an output of private nodal governance, 21 with the process starting in the 1980s when one of the transnational pharmaceutical corporations took the lead in creating an agenda to include US IP rights protection abroad. 22 The pharmaceutical industry engaged in aggressive lobbying campaigns on the need to secure greater patent protection abroad, and also through funding academic studies aimed at proclaiming the merits of patent protection. 23 The US pharmaceutical industry's principle argument was that anything less than an American-style patent protection would constitute stealing by other nations. 24 The industry's strategy was therefore, to persuade US policy-makers to coerce Third World/developing countries to introduce restrictive patent laws into their domestic legislation. 25 Needless to say, the lobbying was a great success, and the US government in the 1980s started introducing suitable provisions protecting IP as an investment activity in the BIT (Bilateral Investment Treaty) programme, which it was negotiating with developing countries during that time. 26 The US pharmaceutical industry also succeeded in making strict international protection of IP rights a central goal of US international economic policy. 27 The then US President Reagan in a 21 Drahos (n 16). See also R Weissman, 'A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries', U Pa J Int'l Econ L 17 (1996) 1069-125, 1076. 22 Drahos (n 16). The author identifies the US pharmaceutical corporation, Pfizer Inc, as taking the lead in lobbying through its well-established business networks to disseminate the idea of a trade-based approach to IP rights, and later on through interlinking of the networks. The author also identifies the role played by the Advisory Committee on Trade Negotiations (ACTN), which was part of a private sector advisory committee system which was to ensure concordance between official US trade objectives and US commerce, and how the CEO of Pfizer Inc, and chairman of ACTN, with the help of other like-minded CEOs of leading US corporations, was able to develop a trade and investment agenda to protect US IP rights abroad. 23 Weissman (n 21) 1076-77. 24 J Kosterlitz, 'Rx: Higher Prices', Nat'l Journal, 25(7) (1993) 396-99. 25 ibid. Starting in 1985, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) served notice on a number of countries informing them about possible trade sanctions if they were to not bring their domestic patent laws in line with American laws. See Weissman (n 21) 1077-78. The USTR acting under Section 301 of the Trade Act 1974, placed countries which did not provide adequate protection to US IP interests on its 'watch lists' and 'priority watch lists'. The primary targets were large Third World/developing countries like India, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan and Thailand, which had begun to develop domestic industries to compete against US pharmaceutical manufacturers in their own markets. See . The author also notes that in 1984, a trade bill was passed by the US Congress, which included provisions for safeguarding of IP as an important consideration in granting developing countries preferential tariff treatment. See also P David, 'Intellectual Property Institutions and the Panda's Thumb: Patent, Copyrights, and the Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and History' in M Wallerstein, ME Mogee and RA Schoen (eds), Global Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology (National Academy Press 1993) 20. The author observes that the USA was able to achieve considerable success in convincing developing and newly industrialised nations to acquiesce to its position on the treatment of various forms of IP with the threat of sanctions, as their retaliatory leverage was quite limited. 27 Weissman (n 21) 1077. The author notes that it was a great success to move the policy in the direction of strict international IP rights protection, as traditional domain of international trade policy was message to Congress in February 1986 proposed that a key item for consideration was to seek much greater protection of US IP interest in overseas territories. 28 The next step for the lobbyists was to move the discussion on international IP rights protection to the GATT negotiations. In 1986, a coalition of 13 major US corporations, including Pfizer, Bristol-Meyers, Merck, and Johnsons & Johnson, to name a few, formed an ad hoc committee called Intellectual Property Committee (IPC) . 29 The stated objective of the committee in its own words was 'dedicated to the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement on intellectual property in the current GATT round of multilateral trade negotiations'. 30 World Intellectual Property Organization, created in 1967, was the first international attempt to address some of the concerns relating to an international IP rights movement. The developing countries were opposed to altering the WIPO system to strengthen IP rights protection. 31 World Intellectual Property Organization, in the eyes of patent-holding developed nations, was incapable of responding effectively to issues relating to IP rights violation. 32 Developed countries, including the USA, European Communities (EC), and Japan acted fast to shift the global IP rights administration from the WIPO to the GATT with a view of achieving the objective of an expanded international IP rights protection regime. Industry groups from patent-holding developed countries successfully created a coalition of governments that would pursue the objective of moving IP rights regulation from the WIPO to the GATT.
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The move for a global IP rights protection mooted by developed countries and led by the USA, was strongly opposed by developing countries including Argentina, Brazil, India, and South Africa, among others. 34 The developing countries were strongly in favour of a WIPO-led negotiation, as opposed to a revision of international IP rights obligations through the GATT, as the WIPO had traditionally been the forum for such matters. Patent-holding businesses in the USA, EC, and Japan, successfully exerted pressure on their respective governments to ensure that IP rights became a global commercial issue and also the focus of attention during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. 36 primarily focused on tariff and related matters. See also C Reitz, 'Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade' U Pa J Int'l Econ L 17 (1996) 559-79, 555. 28 Drahos (n 16). In a message dated 6 February 1986 and entitled 'America's Agenda for the Future' President Reagan proposed that a key item was much greater protection for US intellectual property abroad. 29 Drahos (n 16). See also R Weissman, 'Patent Plunder: TRIPing the Third World', Multinational Monit 11 (November 1990) <http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1990/11/weissman. html> accessed 7 July 2014. 30 Drahos (n 16). See also Weissman (n 29). IPC's close relationship with the USTR permitted it to shape the US proposals and negotiating positions during the course of the GATT negotiations. India, along with similarly placed countries like, Brazil and Argentina, strongly opposed the proposal on the premise that the GATT mandate did not allow for the discussion of substantive issues on IP, and that it was only the WIPO that had the mandate and the institutional competence to discuss such matters. 37 Also, most developing countries that sought membership of the WTO and entered the Uruguay round of negotiations had not been granting patent monopolies for pharmaceuticals. 38 India's position, which was well supported by other developing countries, was that any principle or standard relating to IP rights was to be carefully tested against the needs of developing countries, and that it would be inappropriate to focus the negotiations on the protection of monopoly rights of the owners of IP rights, when almost 99% of the patents were owned by industrialised nations. 39 Throughout the TRIPS negotiations, the USA maintained a firm stance towards reaching a global agreement for higher levels of IP rights protection. This position, essentially calling for the world to adopt a US-style patent law, was developed largely by the pharmaceutical industry, according to the industries' own admission. 40 Although India's position was discussed extensively at the negotiations, by the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990 the developing countries were constrained to change their position completely, paving the way for a US-style IP rights protection to be imposed through the GATT, 41 thereby circumventing and undermining the authority of the WIPO. The long-drawn Uruguay round of negotiations produced the TRIPS Agreement, which came into force in January 1995. The Agreement can be viewed as the most important step in the globalisation of standards of patent, trade secrets and trademark protection, the three areas most relevant to the success of chemical and pharmaceutical companies. 42 Of major significance was the obligation on Member States to make available patents for products and processes without discrimination as to the field of technology 43 and requiring the introduction of product patents for chemical and pharmaceutical patents.
The TRIPS Agreement: flexibilities and the Doha Declaration
The TRIPS Agreement which came into force on 1 January 1995 allows Member States to provide for a more extensive protection of IP right if they wish to, and a minimum standard UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 31) 7. India also stressed that substantive standards on IP rights were more in the realm of socio-economic and technological development, especially in the case of developing countries. It urged that the group focus on restrictive and anti-competitive practices of the owners of IP rights to evolve standards and principles for their elimination and to avoid distortion of trade. See Sundaram (n 34) 8.
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Weissman (n 21). 41 See also SK Sell, 'Cat & Mouse: Forum-Shifting in the Battle over Intellectual Property Enforcement' (Draft, prepared for American Political Science Association Meeting, Toronto, 3-6 September 2009) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1466156> accessed 9 July 2014. See also C Deere, The Implementation Game: The Global Politics of Intellectual Property Reform in Developing Countries (OUP 2009) 53. In the mid-1980s, developing countries faced pressures from both developed countries and knowledge-based multinational companies to agree to the inclusion of a stringent international IP commitment in the multilateral trading system. To break the standoff, developed countries also launched an economic and diplomatic offensive that ultimately forced developing countries to concede. 42 Drahos (n 16). 43 See Article 27.1 of TRIPS.
of protection from others who may not favour the idea of an extensive protection. 44 The Agreement also contains flexibilities in its implementation, which is particularly aimed at developing countries and LDCs. A number of scholarly articles have been written on the subject of flexibilities contained in the TRIPS Agreement and the WTO's failure to address the problem of the access to medicines in developing countries and LDCs. The patent-related flexibilities identified include provision for grant of compulsory licensing, parallel importation, and provisions relating to patentable subject matter, patent rights, abuse of rights, and the control of anticompetitive practices. 45 Some of the other flexibilities identified by commentators include the exhaustion of rights 46 and parallel importation, scope of patentability and optional exclusion, exceptions to patent rights and enforcement. 47 Some developing countries feared that the extended IP rights protection granted for pharmaceutical patents under the Agreement was likely to increase dependency on multinational pharmaceutical companies and affect the developing countries and LDCs severely, as essential medicines could become unaffordable and beyond their reach. 48 The developing countries were fully aware that the patent-holding developed countries, which advocated a wider global IP rights protection and promoted the TRIPS Agreement, had a strong public health-care system and would not be affected by the pharmaceutical patent regime of the Agreement.
The USA and Switzerland (both holding a number of pharmaceutical patents), and well supported by other developed countries, took the stance that the only flexibility afforded under the Agreement was its staggered implementation in certain cases, but in contrast the developing countries were of the firm view that the TRIPS Agreement did not limit their sovereign powers when addressing domestic health crises, such as HIV/AIDS. 49 In short, the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on public health in developing Deere (n 41) 75. The author suggests the development of national policies on utility models, disclosure of origin of genetic material and prior informed consent, and traditional knowledge (folklore and cultural heritage were also mentioned).
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Sundaram (n 5) 5. Access to essential medicines is recognised as an indispensable part of the right to health, is viewed as a non-delegable obligation on the part of the State, and cannot be violated based on lack of available resources. 'The Selection and Use of Essential Medicines' (WHO Technical Report Series 914, 2002) <http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s4875e/s4875e.pdf> accessed 9 July 2014. The developing countries and the LDCs were apprehensive that the TRIPS Agreement if given effect to could severely restrict access to essential medicines within their jurisdictions and also impede any efforts to control diseases, including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. countries and LDCs became a serious issue. Due to growing pressure from the developing countries, and in particular from the Member States from Africa, the Council for TRIPS 50 in June 2001 considered in detail the relationship between public health and TRIPS Agreement. 51 In November 2001, the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health 52 (Doha Declaration) was made, addressing some of the concerns of the developing countries, which also sought to clarify other divergent views, held by the Member States on the application and ambit of the TRIPS Agreement. 53 Under the Doha Declaration, the Member States had the right to grant compulsory licences, to determine the grounds for the grant, and also as to what constituted a national emergency. 54 Some developing countries have made constructive use of the TRIPS flexibilities while giving effect to the TRIPS Agreement into their national legislations. Some countries have delayed the introduction of product patents into their legislation, 55 and others have used the compulsory licensing provisions to manufacture or procure generic medicines at an affordable price. 56 It will not be out of place to point out that the implementation of flexibilities in key pharmaceutical markets such as Brazil, India, and South Africa, came at a very high price, as transnational pharmaceutical corporations, well supported by developed country participation, were able to mount oppositions and cause delays in the actual implementation. In 1996 the World Health Assembly, which was mandated to report on the impact of the work of the WTO with respect to national drug policies and essential drugs, examined the relationship between public health and the TRIPS Agreement. See resolution on the Revised Drug Strategy, Resolution WHA 49.14 (25 May 1996). India, one of the developing countries, has made the maximum use of the flexibilities. India was able to delay the entry of the product patent regime into its patent laws, and ably support its generics market which was developed on the back of the process patent regime introduced in the Patent Act of 1970. Besides, in recent years India has also made use of the compulsory licensing provision introduced in TRIPS compliant legislation of 2005. For a detailed account, see Sundaram (n 34). 56 Brazil, one of the BRIC nations, which introduced the TRIPS compliant patent laws into its national legislation much earlier than others, was able to use the compulsory license provisions under the TRIPS compliant legislation to procure generic medicines at affordable prices for its much lauded anti-AIDS programme. For a detailed account, see Sundaram (n 5). 
Expansion of IP laws: the haunting colonial legacy
IP rights, which evolved in the Middle Ages 58 were introduced by the industrialised colonial powers into their respective colonies and dominions from the nineteenth century. It will be beneficial for the purposes of the current study to cast our thoughts backwards in time to understand the role of colonialism in the expansion of IP laws (industrial property, copyrights, and trademarks) in the nineteenth century in the former colonies. 59 Some of the difficulties in accessing affordable medicines in the developing countries are still rooted in the colonial past, especially in the realm of IP laws introduced during the colonial era. The international movement on IP standards started in the nineteenth century from developed countries to developing countries or from key industrialised Western States to developing countries/former colonies. 60 The IP laws introduced during the colonial era embodied concepts alien to many traditional and indigenous approaches to knowledge and innovation, as Western conceptions of privately held rights over intellectual assets had no local cultural or legal roots. 61 Besides, the colonial administrators held the traditional laws of their dominions in low regard, as they did not serve the commercial interests of the colonisers.
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The IP laws introduced, or rather imposed, during the colonial era were primarily designed to protect and serve the interests of colonial administrators, and purely aimed at extracting wealth from the colonies rather than seeking to educate or promote knowledge in the colonies. Britain, during the colonial era, was keen to emphasise the promotion of the legal profession in its colonies to generate an English legal culture, but this practice was rarely extended to the realm of IP laws. 63 Following their independence from colonial rule, most developing countries in Africa chose to retain the legal system, the laws, and the institutions of governance established during the colonial era by the colonial powers, , the patent system is not chiefly an English creation, as there was a rather well-developed patent system in existence in Venice in the fifteenth century, and the practice of granting monopoly privileges to inventors was widely followed in many parts of western and central Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Drahos (n 37). The author refers to the case of Philippines, where Spanish patent laws were introduced, but only to be later replaced by US patent laws. Similarly in the case of Korea, Japanese patent laws were introduced, but only to be later replaced by US Patent laws. Likewise, in India and Malaysia, Britain introduced the English patent laws in the latter part of the nineteenth century and in the early part of the twentieth century. including IP laws. 64 In most of the former colonies, the establishment of national IP laws only started in the wake of independence from colonial rule. 65 In the Americas, and in some of the former Asian colonies, the era of decolonisation also sparked efforts to substantially revise their IP laws and related policies. 66 A number of countries that emerged from colonial rule in the twentieth century promulgated IP laws that still closely resembled earlier colonial laws or those of the erstwhile colonial powers. 67 A few former colonies like India moved towards a product patent regime during the 1970s, 68 and as a result also emerged as a key player in the generic drugs market. In the Americas, countries like Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina lowered standards of patent protection to stimulate local production of generic medicines. 69 Similarly, the Andean Community, 70 comprising former South American colonies of Chile, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru followed a reformist agenda, in pursuit of a vision for industrial development and regional integration, and adopted common rules on FDI (foreign direct investment), IP rights, and technology 64 Okediji (n 59) 335. After independence, many developing countries and LDCs continued to have as their own domestic laws the old, antiquated Acts and Ordinances of the colonial era. The author also notes that given the socio-economic conditions in most of the former colonies, existing intellectual property laws were not a reform priority as they were either beneficial to the domestic industries or were deemed irrelevant to the domestic public.
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Deere (n 47) 35. In Latin America and the Caribbean, intellectual property laws were established in the wake of independence from the Spanish and Portuguese in the early part of the nineteenth century as opposed to the Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, where intellectual property laws were introduced by colonial powers in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The author points out that several countries in the Americas promulgated formal intellectual property laws far earlier than other developing countries, and indeed earlier than many developed countries.
66
Deere (n 47) 39.
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Deere (n 47) 37. Former British colonies enacted copyright laws based on the same 1911 British Copyright Act that served as the foundation for their colonial laws. Similarly, a number of former French colonies in Africa adopted copyright laws that replicated those of France at the given time, and some others chose to keep the laws introduced during colonial rule. See also T Kongolo, 'The African Intellectual Property Organizations: The Necessity of Adopting One Uniform System for All Africa' (2000) 3(2) JWIP 265-88, 265. The author, discussing the two major African regional IP organizations, namely African Regional Industrial Property Organization (ARIPO) and Organisation Africaine de la Propriété Intellectuelle (OAPI), expresses the view that the systems of protection provided under the said organiszations do not reflect the African realities. This, in the view of the author, is down to the fact that the organisations are modelled after the Western style of intellectual property protection which does not always correspond and fit to the African realities and environment. transfer. 71 One can observe that in the post-colonial era the former colonies adopted different approaches towards their IP laws and policies, where again the policies were shaped by the prevalent colonial legal system, besides other factors including social, economic, and political objectives.
During the colonial era, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the two key international conventions, namely the Paris Convention 72 and the Berne Convention 73 were codified and entered into force. The two conventions were designed to enhance the degree of protection that patent rights holders from developed countries enjoyed in overseas jurisdictions. 74 With very few developing nations participating in the negotiations, only a handful became parties to the two conventions. Interestingly, almost half of the original signatories to the Paris Convention lacked national patent regimes at the time of ratification of the conventions. 75 Brazil, one of the original signatory nations, and a former colony of Portugal, was an exception, as it had established a patent system in the early part of the nineteenth century. 76 Through the mechanism contained in Article 19 of the Berne Convention, 77 the former colonial powers of Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and Spain acceded their colonies to the Convention. 78 The colonial powers were able to pick and choose the colonies that would be covered and the ones that would not be covered in 71 Deere (n 47) 39. Deere (n 47) 36. These two treaties were also aimed at replacing the loose network of reciprocal intellectual property arrangements that European colonial powers had in place in some of the bilateral commercial treaties in the nineteenth century. Notably, both the Paris and Berne Conventions enshrined the principle of National Treatment, which provides that signatory countries shall extend to foreign nationals the same advantages, rights, and legal remedies against infringement as enjoyed by their own nationals. their accession documents. 79 In short, during the colonial era the colonies and dominions did not have a say in their accession process to the conventions. In many cases, post-independence, the former colonies continued to be signatories without the actual need to be part of the regime, as they were mostly unaware of the necessity to have such legislations in their statute books, which were only designed to serve their former colonial masters. In the postcolonial era, a number of larger developing countries were able to delay their accession to international IP conventions. 80 A majority of developing countries in the Americas postponed adherence to the Paris Convention until the 1990s, as they were sceptical of the merits of IP Conventions. 81 In most of their former colonies and dominions, the colonial powers left behind a network of legal systems and institutions, which would in later years assist in the introduction of a more stringent IP law regime, backed by the WTO, to protect the IP rights interests of developed countries.
Part 3
3.1. IP laws: economic analysis vs. human rights Economic Analysis of law presents with the affordability, and at times also the justification of a particular law to be introduced/implemented into a legal environment. While the legislature is authorised with the responsibility to enact laws, the State has the ultimate legal obligation to oversee the implementation of laws for the governance of the nation in the most effective manner possible, while seeking to meet the ends of justice. Prior to any bill being presented before the legislature for discussion, the policy objectives are finalised, which again will be shaped by the policies of the political party in power at a given point in time. An economic analysis of any laws enacted, or that is sought to be enacted, can always present an interesting insight into the political and economic policy objectives for the introduction of the law in question.
Economic theories of IP; traditional views
The foundations of economic theories are deeply entrenched in utilitarianism, and present the framework for analysis of the IP rights, and in particular patent rights, as contained in the TRIPS Agreement. Utilitarian theorists have strongly supported the creation of IP rights as an appropriate means to foster innovation, and in contrast non-utilitarian theorists have looked to the creator's moral rights to have control over their work. 82 The Ross and Vea (n 75) 84-85. The authors point out that the general view prevailing in Latin America was that there was no benefit in joining a convention that was not flexible enough to accommodate the needs of the local economy. Also, the national-treatment principle of the Paris Convention was viewed as a barrier to the design of national regimes dealing with industrial property. They were to become signatories to the Conventions following the entry of the TRIPS Agreement. See also Deere (n 47) 41. also laid down the principle that only a 'true and first inventor' should be granted a monopoly patent. Just over 200 years after the passing of the Statute of Monopolies of 1623, the subject of patent reform was raised before the English Parliament, for the reason that the procedure for obtaining a patent was expensive, clumsy, and uncertain. 84 This was to trigger off a debate in England, and soon to spread to the continent, where economists too would join the debate, to create pro-patent and anti-patent lobbies. 85 The lobbying and debating brought about a number of changes to the laws on patents both in England and in the Continent, besides witnessing the emergence of economic theories on the subject, with notable ones coming from England and France.
Classical writers in England almost completely fell in line with the traditional principles contained in the Statute of Monopolies of 1623 that justified the grant of temporary monopolies for the exploitation of innovations due to their special character and function, and so being exempt from the prohibition of monopoly. Jeremy Bentham, regarded as the founder of modern-day utilitarianism and also a jurist, held the view that there was one species of privilege certainly very advantageous: the patents which are granted in England for a limited time, for inventions in arts and manufactures. Of all the methods of existing and rewarding industry, this is the least burthensome, and the most exactly proportioned to the merit of the invention.
86
He further observed, 'This privilege has nothing in common with monopolies, which are justly decried.'
87 Adam Smith, recognised as the pioneer of political economy, while referring to the risks that a company of merchants undertake and the expenses they incur to establish a new trade, held the opinion that the state should compensate the merchants by granting them a monopoly of the trade for a certain number of years … .
[to] recompense them for hazarding a dangerous and expensive experiment, of which the public is afterwards to reap the benefit. A temporary monopoly of this kind may be vindicated upon the same principles upon which a like monopoly of a new machine is granted to its inventor, and that of a new book to its author. 88 He also felt such monopolies for inventions could be defended on the grounds of equity, 89 and as far as extending the similar rights to new books was concerned he argued that such 84 Machlup and Penrose (n 58) 3. exclusive privilege could be regarded as 'an encouragement to the labours of learned men' and being beneficial to the society. 90 John Stuart Mill, yet another proponent of utilitarianism, took a similar stance and categorically stated that 'the condemnation of monopolies ought not to extend to patents … '. 91 Mill also observed that 'the originator of an improved process is allowed to enjoy, for a limited period, the exclusive privilege of using his own improvement', and that inventors should be both compensated and rewarded. 92 He further argued that … an exclusive privilege, of temporary duration, is preferable; because it leaves nothing to anyone's discretion; because the reward conferred by it depends upon the invention's being found useful, and the greater the usefulness, the greater the reward; and because it is paid by the very persons to whom the services is rendered, the consumers of the commodity.
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Whereas, Michel Chevalier, the French economist was most emphatic in his opposition of both tariffs and patents, declaring that both 'stem from the same doctrine and result in the same abuses'. 94 The opponents of the privilege and monopoly were able to ideologically link patent protectionism with tariff protectionism and patent monopoly, to argue against monopoly privileges, which was clearly exemplified in the views expressed by Michel Chevalier. On the other hand, the advocates of a strong patent protection were able to separate the idea of patent protection from the monopoly issue and free trade issue to present the case of patent protection as one of natural law and private property, and of man's right to live by his work. 95 David Hume argued that property has no purpose where there is abundance; it arises, and derives its significance, out of the scarcity of the objects that become appropriated, in a world in which people desire to benefit from their own work and sacrifice. 96 Systems of Justice, he went on, protect property rights solely on account of their utility. Where the security of property is adequately assured, property owners generally see to it, that scarce 'means' are directed to those uses, which within their knowledge and judgement are most productive of what they want. 97 Yet another strand of thought to emerge in the eighteenth century and was to play an important role in the centuries to come was that man has a 'natural property right' in his own 90 Adam Smith argued that such exclusive privileges granted to authors could be beneficial if the book be a valuable one the demand for it in that time will probably be a considerable addition to his fortune. But if it is of no value the advantage he can reap from it will be very small. Smith (n 88). Machlup and Penrose (n 58) 9. The authors, writing in 1950, observe that these arguments were still being used in the twentieth century in debates on the issue. ideas. The French Constitutional Assembly in 1791 passed the patent laws, the preamble to which read as follows:
… that every novel idea whose realization or development can become useful to society belongs primarily to him who conceived it, and that it would be a violation of the rights of man in their very essence if an industrial invention were not regarded as the property of its creator. 98 The above preamble to a greater degree captured and encapsulated the spirit of the arguments of the pro-patent economists who favoured the grant of a patent monopoly. The Congress in the USA was soon to follow suit with the introduction of new patent laws in 1793, which was based on the copyright provisions contained in its Constitution. 99 It is clear that the framers of the US Constitution perceived the patent system as one of incentives and rewards.
In a letter written on 13 August 1813 to the inventor Isaac McPherson, Thomas Jefferson expressed the view that [i] f nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of it. 100 He further added that … ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and 98 A Schuller, Handbuch der Gesetze über ausschliessende Privilegien auf neue Erfindungen, Entdeckungen und Verbesserungen im Gebiete der Industrie (Karl Gerold 1843). As cited in Machlup and Penrose (n 58) 11. One of the main arguments put forth by Stanislas de Bouffle at the time of presenting the bill to the French Constitutional Assembly in 1790 was that a man's property in his ideas was more sacred than his property in things material. See benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any point, and like the air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation. 101 Jefferson proceeds to reject the argument of the French philosophers that inventors and authors had a 'natural rights' claim to property in their creations. He was clear in his view that inventions cannot be a subject of property in nature. 102 Jefferson's comments came two decades after the passing of the first US laws on the subject in 1793, and also the fact that he was the principle author of the US Declaration of Independence and the third President of the USA cannot be ignored here.
The mainstream economics profession has consistently argued that inventors need support and protection from the government for their innovations in order to maintain an incentive for creative inquiry. The economic justification for protection of IP rights is founded on the premise that unless an invention or a creation is compensated at its full social value, there will be very little incentives to undertake or engage in such activities. 103 Patent rights are deliberate creations of statue law, and it is the intention of the legislators that the beneficiary shall be placed in a position to secure an income from the monopoly conferred upon him by placing restrictions on the supply of the information.
104 Grant of such rights is intended to stimulate innovation by allowing the rights holder to work his patented product for a definite period of time to recover the investment, and also make a profit. Such exclusive rights are designed to empower the rights holder to prevent third parties from unauthorised use of the subject matter. So, one can assume that the statutes creating and granting patent rights monopolies would not have continued to remain in statute books, in the absence of a widespread expectation of public advantage from their operation. 105 The dissenting tradition has argued that government action of any kind, including the awarding of copyrights and patents, is unnecessary to stimulate such activity. 106 The picture that emerges is a debate of polarised views, with one side arguing that ideas should benefit the public and other side arguing that individuals should benefit from their ideas.
Economic analysis of IP laws
As mentioned earlier, the foundations of economic theories are deeply entrenched in utilitarianism, which also provides the philosophical basis for property rights, both tangible and 101 David (n 26) 26. 102 Jefferson also argued:
Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property. Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according to the will and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint from anybody. See also David (n 26) 26. 103 MJ Trebilcock, R Howse and A Eliason, The Regulation of International Trade (Routledge 2013) 515-16. The authors observe that ' … in terms of neo-classical trade theory, whether a particular country will want stronger or weaker intellectual property protection will depend on whether its comparative advantage lies more in innovation or in the imitation and adaptation of others' innovations'. 104 Plant (n 96). 105 Plant (n 96). 106 Plant (n 96).
intangible. This section of the article seeks to analyse some of the key economic theories to emerge in the twentieth century on the subject of IP rights which lay the foundations for the creation of an international IP rights protection regime to come in the form of the TRIPS Agreement under the auspices of the WTO. This section will also briefly study some of the views to emerge in more recent times in the twenty-first century. The term intellectual property has come to denote a whole set of intangible property rights which can be identified broadly under patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. Currently, as it stands, the principal policy objective of IP laws is the promotion of new and improved works through the recognition and creation of property rights, whether it is in the realms of expressive media, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, or technology, besides recognising other forms. It will, hence, be beneficial for our purposes to present a more contemporary analysis of the economic foundations of IP rights and the justification for the grant of exclusive rights for inventions and other similar intangibles. The study will initially focus on IP in general, and thereafter proceeding to focus on patents, more particularly on pharmaceutical patents.
There had been a fundamental shift in conventional thinking of trade as goods oriented, which was brought about as a result of the sheer significance of IP to developed economies. 107 The modern-day IP rights principles are strongly modelled on the US IP regime, which in turn is severely influenced by the pharmaceutical industry, computing industry, and music and motion picture industry. Today, much of the value of the leading corporate bodies in the world are estimated by their portfolio of intangible assets, which range from the better defined forms of IP (patents and copyrights) to the least tangible of the intangibles (trade secrets and trademarks).
108 Steve Calandrillo explains the justification behind the US IP regime as being built on the premise that it is socially desirable to encourage and produce many types of information, whose value to society far exceeds its developmental costs. 109 Calandrillo asserts that most supporters of the US incentive system ignore the exorbitant costs it involves, and the restrictions placed upon the availability of information generated by the system. Needless to say, IP rights generally confer an exclusive right to exploit the protected subject matter, or in other words, confer a right on the titleholder to prevent third parties from using the protected knowledge without authorisation. Correa (n 58). The author argues that such exclusivity also impedes the diffusion and use of the knowledge so protected. 111 JE Stiglitz, 'Knowledge as a Global Public Good' in I Kaul, I Grunberg and MA Stern (eds), Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (OUP 1999) 308-25, 325. The author, while arguing that knowledge is a public good, expresses the view that Thomas Jefferson anticipated the modern concept of public good when he wrote to Isaac McPherson, the inventor in 1813 as follows: 'he who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me'; David (n 26), where the author argues that Jefferson grasped the essential point that the cost of transmitting useful knowledge in codified form is negligible when compared with the cost of creating it, and that for society's need to encourage the pursuit of ideas, such information should be distributed freely. See MA Lemley, 'The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law' (1997) 75 Texas L Rev 989-1084, 995, and sometimes at no cost. But knowledge can be made excludable through actions by its possessor or through legal means.
112 Knowledge and intellectual products are intangible and not appropriable, unlike tangible goods which can be appropriated and separated from the commons.
113 Also, the 'consumption' of intangible goods would leave the same quantity and quality of such goods to be consumed and enjoyed by others.
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As it stands, IP rights are supposed to encourage innovation. Some authors have expressed doubts as it is difficult to establish this position, and also on the other hand, IP rights attempt to restrict the use of knowledge in one way or another and pose potential impediments to diffusion and cumulative innovation. 115 The number of patents granted in a technologically fast growing world, especially set against the backdrop of a globalised economy, requires a different philosophical basis and a clear set of theories to justify their grant than what was presented in the nineteenth-century USA and Europe, as the rationale for grant of a monopoly has changed. 116 Until the early part of the 1990s very little empirical research was done on the impact of economics on public policy in the area of IP rights, especially in comparison to the influence of professional writings in areas such as antitrust and taxation. 117 In the IP system, the patent right is the most powerful right, which enables the rights holder (patentee) to exclude all others from making, selling, or using the subject where the author observes that public goods are 'nonrivalrous' as everyone can benefit from them once they are produced. See also RS Gruner, 'Dispelling the Myth of Patents as Nonrivalrous Property: Patents as Tools for Allocating Scarce Labor and Resources' (2011) 13 Colum Sci & Tech L Rev 1-70. The author argues that patents are mistakenly described as nonrivalrous property, and patent rights actually govern nonrivolsous actions of parties using patented inventions, besides regulating highly rivalrous allocations of scarce resources to the production of patented inventions.
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Correa (n 110). The author argues that a company may prevent its competitors from knowing how a particular manufacturing process operates by tightly controlling access to its physical premises and preventing the disclosure of relevant data by its employees. See also Menell and Scotchmer (n 108). According to the authors, knowledge is 'non-excludable' in its natural state, even if someone claims to own the knowledge, it is difficult to exclude others from using it. IP laws attempt to solve this problem by legal means, by granting exclusive use of the protected knowledge or creative work to the creator. Through the device of intellectual property the inventor can control entry and exclude users from the intangible assets. See also NS Kinsella, 'Against Intellectual Property' (2001) 15(2) J Libertarian Stud 1-53. The author strongly argues that in today's world, the institution of intellectual property rights deliberately creates scarcity when none existed before, so as to enable the commodification and appropriation of otherwise plentiful, non-rivalrous intellectual goods. For instance, significant changes have taken place in the legal approach to the grant of patents to software since the late 1970s. When VisiCalc, the first computer spreadsheet program, was developed in 1979, the US Patent Office, relying upon US Supreme Court case law, took the position that the mathematical algorithms in computer programs were incapable of being protected as a subject matter. This position was, of course, to change when the US Supreme Court in the Diamond v Diehr case [450 U.S. 175, 185-187 (1981)] held that controlling the execution of a physical process, by running a computer program did not preclude patentability of the invention as a whole, and found patentable subject matter in a process utilising a computer algorithm. matter of a valid patent for a prescribed period of time. 118 In practice, the patent offers the rights holder the incentive of a statutory right to exclude others from use as a means of inducing activity.
119 It can be seen that the right of the patent owner is conditioned on the disclosure of the subject matter to the public when the patent is issued.
120 Also, such rights allow the patentee to obtain the reward for the innovation by sale of the right conferred for a fee/royalty, or to retain the exclusive exploitation rights. 121 Currently, under the TRIPS Agreement the term of the patent granted is for a period of 20 years, but some pharmaceutical patent holders are known to extend this term beyond the said period.
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Guido Calabresi and Ronald Coase in the 1960s were the first to attempt and apply economic analysis in a systematic way to areas of law that did not purport to regulate economic relationships.
123 Edmund Kitch, a legal scholar and economist, is of the opinion that although good progress was made in the understanding of economics of IP rights in the twentieth century, much still remains to be done. 124 Kitch, in his article, identifies recurring errors in the literature on the subject matter and proceeds to analyse them individually. He is of the strong view that writers over a period of time have repeatedly analysed IP rights on the assumption that they confer an economic monopoly on the rights holder.
125 Kitch observes that most authors begin with an analysis of IP rights on the presumption that the rights holder of the IP possesses an economic monopoly, namely a monopoly where the rights holder is protected from competition and is also able to sell into a market with a downward sloping demand curve. 126 He further argues that characterization of patents as a monopoly can only be true if the claims cover all of an economically relevant market, that is, there is no alternative way for competitors to provide the same economic functionality to their customers without infringing the claims. The error that Kitch identifies in the analysis carried out by most writers on the subject is the use of the basic diagram/ graph to study the competitive market where the parameters are not clearly identified, and hence 'the market reflected in the diagram is not the market for the intellectual property 118 ibid 7. The patentee can even prevent an independent subsequent discoverer of the same subject matter from making, using, or selling it.
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Besen and Raskind (n 117) 8. 120 ibid. 121 ML Katz and C Shapiro, 'On the Licensing of Innovations' (1985) 16(4) RAND J Econ 504-20. The authors argue that major innovations are not normally licensed, but equally efficient firms will tend to license minor innovations, and also for some innovations, licensing is both privately and socially undesirable. 127 For Kitch, the empirical question if IP rights confer any economic monopoly, although persistently raised in the literature; is not properly addressed, as it is addressed only in passing. 128 Kitch also notes that much of the analysis of IP rights proceeds on the footing that an author or inventor creates a work or an invention, who then wishes to exploit it commercially. This analysis, according to Kitch, conveniently leaves out of the equitation the interaction between IP rights on any one work or invention and the creation of other works and inventions -in other words it forgets or ignores the fact that authors make use of existing cultural elements; likewise, inventors build on the work of inventors who preceded them.
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Suzzane Scotchmer presents a similar, and more emphatic argument on the point, by stating that most innovators 'stand on the shoulders of giants, and never more so than in the current evolution of high technologies, where almost all technical progress builds on a foundation provided by earlier innovators'. 130 Scotchmer presents instances in support of her argument, from molecular biology, pharmaceuticals, computers, and cotton gin. Scotchmer's primary argument is that later-day innovators simply bettered previous technologies. She also observes that most economic literature on patenting has proceeded to study innovations in isolation, without focusing on the externalities or spill-overs that early innovators confer on later innovators. But the cumulative nature of research poses problems for the optimal design of patent law that are not addressed by that perspective.
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Based on the above, one is tempted to conclude, instantly, that it is mere cumulative research leading to innovation, which in the eye of the law is patentable and hence resulting in the 'inventor' being rewarded with exclusive patent rights.
Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Laureate in economics, observes that many of the most important ideas like the mathematics that underlies the modern computer, the fundamentals behind atomic energy, lasers, etc., are not protected by IP rights, and have been used freely by academics and researchers, and also that academics disseminate their research findings without charging for them. He is also of the strong opinion that products of immediate commercial value can be produced without IP protection. Stiglitz argues that, in contrast, an IP regime rewards innovators by creating a temporary monopoly power, which allows the rights holder to charge far higher prices than they could possibly 127 ibid 1734. Kitch also opines that all systems of property rights do involve costs to define the scope of their rights, in detecting and preventing trespass, and also in foreclosing particular productive opportunities that might be possible if the property system did not exist. Any system of property rights is appropriately subject to examination as to whether the benefits of the property system outweigh these costs, but that examination has nothing to do with the social welfare loss caused by economic monopolies. 128 See Lemley (n 111) 996. The author makes an interesting observation that while some intellectual property rights 'may in fact give their owner power in an economically relevant product market, most do not; they merely prevent others from competing to sell copies of a particular product, not from selling different products that compete with the original'. charge if there were to be a competition. He is of the further view that in the above process, ideas are used and disseminated far lesser than they would be otherwise. 132 For Stiglitz, once a monopoly is established under an IP regime it may be hard to dislodge, as a monopoly can use its market power to crush competitors, and cites Microsoft as a classic example. Fritz Machlup, in a study carried out on the US patent system for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, observes that there is a general perception that 'property' and 'monopoly' are one and the same from an economic perspective, and the rights holder of an invention has a 'monopoly' over its use just as the owner of a house has a 'monopoly' of the use of the house, which according to Machlup could encumber economic analysis. 133 In his view, 'property' and 'monopoly' has almost nothing to do with each other, for a seller owning his wares will have property but not monopoly -if others sell similar things in the same market. Likewise, for a seller who controls the price of what he sells in a certain market, as there is no serious competition, may have a monopoly but not property -if he does not own what he sells. 134 What one need to be mindful of is that the term property, although used frequently in discussions, is indeed complex and highly political besides being in every way legal, as it vests the individual with tangible and intangible rights.
For Landes and Posner, the standard rationale of patent law is that 'it is an efficient method of enabling the benefits of research and development to be internalized, thus promoting innovation and technological progress'. 135 According to Landes and Posner, the rationale for granting legal protection to inventions is the difficulty that a manufacture may encounter while trying to recover his fixed costs of research and development (R&D) when the product or process that embodies a new invention is readily 'copiable'. But this protection presents a greater danger, as the 'inventor will be enabled to charge a higher price than he needs to recover for the fixed costs of his invention, thereby restricting access to the invention more than is necessary'. 136 Landes and Posner also argue that the greater the patent protection afforded, the smaller the benefit to competitors, as there will be very little information available to them and any costs of working around the patent will be higher. 137 They also assert that a patentee's monopoly mark-up, which is influenced by the degree of protection afforded, bears no direct relation to the fixed costs that the patentee incurred in the creation of the patented product. Landes and Posner also maintain that legislation and policy are for the most part non-excludable public goods, 138 IP is an excludable public good. While this is the case, the public-choice theory, seen as the driving force behind policy decisions, had neither succeeded in explaining the forces that brought into being the system of property rights that is fundamental to a capitalist economy, nor had it said anything about the extension of that system to encompass IP.
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Richard Posner, in a more recent contribution made to an online blog, expresses concerns that both patent and copyright protection, particularly the former, may be excessive. He argues that the cost of inventing must be comparable to the cost of copying in order to determine the optimal patent protection for an inventor, and that when patent protection is too strongly in favour of the inventor, market efficiency is decreased. 140 Posner also avers that pharmaceutical drugs are the 'poster child' for patent protection, and that 'few other products have the characteristics that make patent protection indispensable to the pharmaceutical industry'. 141 The most interesting, if not scathing, comment to come from Posner is with regard to the 20-year duration of the patent protection, which he feels confers no real benefit -except to enable the producer to extract licence fees from firms wanting to make a different product that incorporates his invention. Posner concludes the brief with a parting shot that the need for reform of both patent and copyright laws is sufficiently acute to warrant a serious attention from the US Congress and the courts. 142 In his view, the long protection given to patents under the current US laws, leads to profiteering by the rights holder, which defeats the very basis for the grant of a patent protection. This strong criticism can be extended to the 20-year patent protection granted under the TRIPS Agreement, which was in turn shaped by the US-led developed countries during the Uruguay Round of negotiations.
From the above discussions what one can infer is that economic theories have not yet succeeded in producing a convincing and coherent set of principles to justify IP protection for intangible rights. This argument can be extended to its global applications too, as the American IP protection policy narrative has been embraced by developed nations and applied globally through the WTO. What we witness now is the evolution of IP laws following the school of thought based on 'wealth maximisation', 143 and the establishment of an international regime which provides strong IP rights protection for innovations, which are held and exploited by patent-holding developed nations, to the detriment of non-owners. This approach to IP rights protection goes even beyond the utilitarian principles expounded by Jeremy Bentham, as it completely disregards other human values, including the needs of the society. While making the above criticism one cannot ignore the fact that we live in an information-driven society, where developed economies are strong information producers and naturally expected to support the establishment of strong IP rights laws to serve their interests. In the above landscape, IP rights policies emerge as essential organisational principles of the knowledge-based economy, since it determines the way in which knowledge relations are structured and governed. 144 The modern, or contemporary, perception of IP rights is strongly influenced and shaped by US expansionist economic policies and law making. It has its foundations in utilitarianism, Lockean model of natural laws, besides being strongly influenced by the common law notions of property rights. This understanding of IP, as propagated by Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, and later by Anglo-American jurisprudence (which in turn is influenced by Posnerian economic analysis from the 1970s), has paved the way for a winner-take-all 'wealth maximisation' approach. One should note that the USA and its allies (developed countries with a similar vision) have a strong knowledge-based economy and can afford to promote an IP rights regime which gives the rights holder an extended term of monopoly over information/knowledge, which makes any IP product relying on such information scarce and unaffordable in the developing world. This approach to IP, most notably, has a significant impact on the pharmaceutical products and affects access to medicines in developing countries and LDCs.
Human rights analysis of IP rights and the TRIPS Agreement
One key area of study that is constantly overlooked while discussing the importance of IP policy and legislation is the human rights aspect for the grant of IP rights. This lacuna in the debate on the justification for grant of property rights for intangibles has particularly gained in significance in the case of pharmaceutical patents, as access to medicines have become a major issue since the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement. As a result, there is an inadequate understanding of the complex justification of IP rights policy, legislation, conventions, and most importantly the TRIPS Agreement, which while extending the period of patents on pharmaceutical and other patents to 20 years, has effectively outlawed process patents of pharmaceuticals. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR) provides that 'everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he [ was drafted less than three years after the end of the II World War and science and technology as well as copyright based propaganda had been abused for atrocious purposes by those who lost the war. Such an abuse had to be prevented for the future and it was felt that the best way forward was to recognize that everyone had a share in the benefits and that at the same time those who made valuable contributions were entitled to protection. found in the above international instruments was no accident. 147 These solemn assertions are to be found in the international conventions passed post-Second World War. Similarly, commitment to the guarantee of the right to good health is to be found in most national constitutions. These guarantees, or undertakings, made at the highest levels of governance have now been jeopardised by the development of international instruments, both through the WTO under multilateral trade agreements, and other multilateral agreements negotiated by developed nations and their trading partners. It will not be out of place to point out that there is no reference to human rights appearing in the Paris Convention, 148 Berne Convention, 149 the Rome Conventions, 150 and in the more recently adopted TRIPS Agreement. Importantly, the TRIPS Agreement requires all Member States to comply with pre-existing international agreements on IP laws, including the Paris Convention and Berne Convention. But all the above treaties do refer to the protections granted to authors and inventors as 'rights'. Helfer and Austin argue that the principal justification for such rights lies not in deontological claims about the inalienable liberties of human beings, but rather in the economic and instrumental benefits that flow from the protection of IP across national borders.
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IP rights protection is alluded to in the human rights protection found in the cultural rights of Article 25 of the UDHR and Article 15 of the ICESR. Principles of human rights demand that all individuals are granted, or, are presumed to have the right to good health. Article 25(1) of the UDHR provides that everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. 152 Likewise, Article 15.1(c) of the ICESCR recognises the right of the creator to 'benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author', and such expression entitles 'both individuals What we know is that the initial strong criticism that intellectual property was not properly speaking a Human Right or that is already attracted sufficient protection under the regime of protection afforded to property rights in general was eventually defeated by a coalition of those who primarily voted in favour because they felt that the moral rights deserved and needed protection and met the Human Rights standard and those who felt the ongoing internationalization of copyright needed a boost and that this could be a tool in this respect. or groups or communities to a right to IP protection for his own creation'.
153 Similar expressions are to be found in Article 27 of the UDHR regarding the individual's right to 'the protection of the moral and material interest resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author'. 154 What is glaringly missing here is the exact scope of the right to 'scientific, literary or artistic production', as it is unclear if it includes inventors and patent protection. 155 When examining the implications of IP rights over human rights, policy-makers, inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations, international bureaucrats, and scholars usually employ the conflict approach or the coexistence approach. 156 The first-mentioned conflict approach views the two sets of rights as being in fundamental conflict and the coexistence approach considers them as essentially compatible. 157 Professor Peter Yu notes that while the two approaches may have its own benefits and drawbacks, both ignore, or overlook the fact that 'some attributes of intellectual property rights are protected in international or regional human rights instruments while other attributes do not have any human rights basis at all'. 158 Interestingly, United Nations (UN) Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, and the WTO has adopted the conflict approach and the coexistence approach, respectively. Professor Yu presents a third approach and argues that instead of inquiring whether human rights and intellectual property rights conflict or coexist with each other, it is important to identify the human attributes of intellectual property rights and distinguish them from the non-human rights aspects of intellectual property protection. 159 The existing tensions between IP rights and human rights were summarized by the UN Committee on Economics, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in 2001 as follows: 'The allocation of rights over IP has significant economic, social and cultural consequences that can affect the enjoyment of human rights.' 160 These tensions are obviously driven by the manner in which creative works, cultural heritage, and scientific knowledge are turned into property at an alarming pace, which has significant human rights implications. 161 Audrey Chapman expresses the strong view that IP rights should be viewed as human rights, as the three provisions of Article 15.1(c) of the ICESCR were viewed by drafters as intrinsically interrelated to one another, that the rights of authors and creators were understood as essential preconditions for cultural freedom and participation and scientific progress and not as good in themselves. 162 Chapman also argues that in order to be consistent with the provisions of Article 15, IP laws must assure that IP protections complement, fully respect, and promote other components of Article 15. This caveat is served so that the rights of authors and creators facilitate rather than constrain cultural participation on the one side and scientific progress and access on the other. 163 For Chapman, under the human rights approach, an author, artist, or creator can be a group or a community as well as an individual. This approach strikes a balance between the rights of inventors and creators and the interests of the wider society within IP paradigms and it makes it far more explicit and exacting, which means the rights of the creator are not absolute but conditional on contributing to the common good and welfare of society. 164 There is yet another argument that some aspects of IP rights have potentially adverse implications for human rights, 165 which finds support in the observations made in the study carried out by the High Commission on Human Rights on the impact of TRIPS Agreement on human rights. This study acknowledges that Article 15 of the ICESCR clearly identifies the need to balance the protection of both public and private interests. 166 The UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) CESCR adopted General Comment 17, which elaborates on the right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary, or artistic production of which he is the author, as set out in Article 15.1(c), of the Covenant. 167 It is noted in General Comment 17 that human rights are fundamental and inalienable and are universal entitlements belonging to individuals and, under certain circumstances, groups of individuals and communities. It further elaborates that human rights are fundamental as being inherent to the human person as such, whereas IP rights are means through which States seek to provide incentives for inventiveness and creativity, encourage the dissemination of creative and innovative productions, as well as the development of cultural identities, and preserve the integrity of scientific, literary, and artistic productions for the benefit of society as a whole. 168 The most interesting comments come in Paragraph 2 of the General Comments, where it is stated that human rights are timeless expressions of fundamental entitlements of the human person, whereas IP rights are of a temporary nature, and can be revoked, licensed, or assigned to third parties, and can also be allocated, limited in time and scope, traded, amended, and even forfeited. 169 Besides, the scope of protection of the moral and material interests of an author provided for by Article 15.1(c), does not necessarily coincide with what is referred to as IP rights under national legislations or international instruments, and hence, it is important that IP rights are not sought to be balanced with the human rights recognised in Article 15.1(c).
170 A bare reading of the above international instruments causes confusion, as IP rights are identified as human rights, which has a far wider scope to achieve than the narrow private proprietorial right envisaged under IP rights. This has undermined the position of the advocates of human rights who see IP rights being given preference over their right to good health and life in the debate on access to affordable medicines. While the above debate rages on, the expanded IP rights protection imposed through the WTO had caused unnecessary hardship and suffering in the developing countries and LDCs due to scarcity of access to affordable medicines. What is obvious from the above discussion is that the relationship between IP rights and human rights remains unclear 171 to the greatest disadvantage of the real sufferers from the exploitation of IP rights by transnational corporations.
Most Member States of the WTO who have undertaken to implement the minimum standards of IP protection in the TRIPS Agreement have also ratified the ICESR, which means that the Member States have a double duty to implement the minimum standards of the Agreement bearing in mind their human rights obligation. 172 The question that we ask is should the Member States interpret the Agreement as only safeguarding trade interests, or should it be read in the light of the importance of upholding the needs and interests of all market actors, including corporations and individual human beings?
173 Importantly, do all international instruments, including the specialist TRIPS Agreement strike a right balance between human rights and IP rights? Sadly, the literature available on the point seems to indicate that they do not strike a balance, and one can assume that IP rights have a more favoured position than human rights in the debate. Finding a link between the standards of TRIPS and human rights is not the same as saying that TRIPS takes a human rights approach to IP protection; the primary question is whether TRIPS strikes a balance that is consistent with a human rights approach. 174 The Resolution 2000/7 of the UN Commission on Human Rights on IP and human rights goes as far as to state that the WTO is 'a veritable nightmare' 168 General Comment 17 (n 167) para 1. 169 General Comment 17 (n 167) para 2. for certain sectors of humanity, 175 in that the TRIPS Agreement in some ways encourages, or has as a side-effect human rights violations. 176 The report concludes thus:
Since the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement does not adequately reflect the fundamental nature and indivisibility of all human rights, including the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, the right to health, the right to food and the right to selfdetermination, there are apparent conflicts between the intellectual property rights embodied in the TRIPS Agreement, on the one hand, and international human rights law on the other.
The above Resolution of the Sub-Commission on Human Rights also identifies the areas of actual or potential conflict between human rights and IP rights as impediments resulting from the application of IP rights to the transfer of technology to developing countries; the consequences of plant variety rights and the patenting of genetically modified organisms for the enjoyment of the basic right to food; the reduction of control by communities (especially indigenous communities) over their own genetic and natural resources and cultural values, leading to accusations of 'biopiracy'; restrictions on access to patented pharmaceuticals and the implications for the enjoyment of a basic right to health. 177 The Resolution goes further to affirm the right to protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary, or artistic production of which one is the author as a human right, which is, however, subject to limitations in the public interest. A year later in 2001, Resolution 2001/21, 178 was adopted wherein it was noted that the implementation of TRIPS did not adequately reflect the fundamental nature and indivisibility of all human rights, including the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, and that there are apparent conflicts between the IP rights regime embodied in TRIPS, on the one hand, and international human rights law, on the other. The resolution also recommended that an assessment be made to study if the patent 'as a legal instrument' was compatible with the promotion and protection of human rights; and the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on the rights of indigenous peoples. It is relevant to point out here that both Resolutions, 2000/7 and 2001/21, of the Sub-Commission observe that human rights prevailed over all economic rights and should be taken into account in the drafting of economic rights policies. 179 Sadly, not much progress has been made since the making of the above two resolutions.
It is abundantly clear that there exists an apparent conflict between the 'private' interests of IP rights holders, which is contained in the TRIPS Agreement, and the 'social' or 'public' concerns found in international human rights law. 180 The TRIPS Agreement has successfully tilted the balance inherent in IP law away from the public interest and in favour of IP rights holders. 181 One of the major shortcomings of the TRIPS Agreement is that it 175 See UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 2000/7 (n 157). does not have the promotion and protection of human rights at the heart of the aim of IP protection, but rather more as an exception. The promotion of health, nutrition, etc., which are links to human rights, are all generally expressed in terms of exceptions to the rule. 182 Further, the TRIPS Agreement only recognises individual rights by clearly stating in the preamble that IP rights are private rights, which ignores the creativity and innovation of groups and communities. 183 This position undoubtedly weakens the objectives on human rights contained in the Agreement. As observed by Dutfield and Suthersanan, the resolutions and reports produced by the UN Commission on Human Rights in the area of IP rights have been unanimous in their view that there was a need for law makers to take international human rights into account in international economic policy formulation and emphasised the primacy of the former over the latter. 184 The authors also point out that none of the resolutions and reports suggest that IP rights per se conflict with human rights, but rather that the problems lie in the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, and that the implication is that there must be a concerted attempt to interpret TRIPS as if human rights norms and considerations were part of the drafting process.
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The right to health as found in international instruments, due to its indeterminacy and vagueness, makes it appear more aspirational rather than justiciable and hence difficult to implement at the national level, 186 and it is hence important to clarify the position of the right to health and its remit in international instruments. UDHR and other international instruments view IP rights as part and parcel of human rights, or in other words IP rights are seen as being contained in human rights. This position only favours those seeking a much stronger and wider IP rights protection, which effectively sidelines all other social and public concerns at the heart of the human rights argument. As Michael Santoro points out, negative rights require the duty holder to ' … forbear from interfering with the right holder', whereas positive rights like the right to health care will require someone to act for, or provide something to the right holder. 187 This, according to Santoro 'raises the question of who exactly has a duty to honour the human right to drugs'. 188 The problem clearly appears to be the mistake of trying to balance out private rights (negative rights) with the right to health (positive right). Here, the right to health suffers a setback, as the private right that is sought to be balanced with it is also described as a human right, which it is not in actual terms. Thomas Pogge argues that the current international rules which are shaped by developed/wealthier countries contribute to massive deprivations among the disadvantaged, and are therefore unjust, and those responsible for the design and imposition of the said rules are not merely failing to protect human rights, but are actively violating the rights of billions.
189 He further urges the developed nations to work towards reform or to compensate for the harm caused. 
Access to medicines as human right
Improving access to affordable medicines in the developing countries and LDCs had been on the agenda of international bodies for well over four decades, resulting in the adoption of resolutions and declarations. These resolutions and declaration meant a clear commitment from developed nations and developing nations to devote time and resources to address the issue of access to medicines. In the 1980s, HIV/AIDS, a previously unknown disease, affected populations across the globe, with the most vulnerable populations coming from the developing and least developed parts of the world. While progress has been made in the treatment of the disease, it still remains inaccessible to a majority of the population who suffer from it. Those affected by HIV/AIDS but with access to the best treatment options still live in developed countries, and those with little or no access to medicines and treatment live in developing countries and LDCs. The developed countries hold the patent rights to most medicines which offer the best treatment options possible for the treatment of HIV/AIDS. By moving the protection of IP rights (which importantly includes pharmaceutical patents) from the remit of the WIPO to the WTO, and extending the patent protection to 20 years, the developed countries have made access to life-saving medicines even more difficult to achieve, both in the short and long terms. These changes made in the late 1980s to ensure that IP rights protection was granted at a global level, saw the introduction of the TRIPS Agreement, which in some ways seeks to strike a balance between IP rights and access to medicines. The TRIPS Agreement has instead struck a discord, and has only made access to life-saving medicines an even more difficult task to achieve in developing countries and LDCs.
The clash between human rights and IP is clearly epitomised by the issue of access to patented medicines. 190 The problems faced in access to medicines in developing countries and LDCs have presented the stark realities of the ills of an extended international protection regime for IP rights, more particularly pharmaceutical patent protection, as the cost of access to affordable medicines, as opposed to an available cure has clearly contributed to the loss of lives of innocent human beings. The developed nations who advocated the wider, global IP protection at the WTO will not be affected by the rising cost of access to affordable medicines, as they do have in place a robust health-care system through which they also administer the access to medicines to its citizens. For instance, in developed countries, antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) have 'transformed AIDS from a death sentence to a chronic illness and saved thousands of lives', but in sharp contrast, even at the reduced price of $300 per year the drugs remain out of reach for the 25 million sub-Saharan Africans suffering from HIV and AIDS.
191 Unfortunately, for the AIDS patients in developing countries and LDCs, the ARVs for frontline treatment are inaccessible due to its exorbitant price, which again is fixed by The authors argue that many of the diseases and health conditions that account for a large part of the disease burden in low-and middle-income countries are far less common in high-income countries. Also, according to the authors, just eight diseases and conditions account for 29% of all deaths in low-and middle-income countries, namely TB, HIV/AIDS, diarrheal diseases, vaccine-preventable diseases of childhood, malaria, respiratory infections, maternal conditions, and neonatal deaths. transnational pharmaceutical corporations. 192 The only option available in such countries is the use of affordable generics, the procurement of which in some instances has become highly problematic. 193 It is also to be noted that the production and procurement of generics has almost been outlawed by the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. Patients from developing countries and LDCs suffer most from the impact of the TRIPS, as the implementation of the Agreement has seen the price of patented drugs rise exponentially in a very short time, defying any logic.
Professor Graham Dutfield identifies poverty as the main reason for not being able to access medicines, and governments, even those that are not corrupt or otherwise woefully dysfunctional, lack the resources and infrastructure to get them to those who need medicines but cannot afford them. 194 These factors, according to Dutfield, are used cleverly by the pharmaceutical industry to stave off any argument that patent rights allow them to set high prices that keep life-saving drugs out of the reach of the poor. 195 In the twentyfirst century globalised economy, the existence of medicines, or cure, does not guarantee their accessibility to the poor and needy in developing countries and LDCs, who were compelled to embrace an IP regime under the TRIPS Agreement which is to their absolute disadvantage. The idea of withholding life-saving drugs from individuals suffering from fatal or debilitating diseases when the means exist to distribute those drugs cheaply and effectively is anathema to all notions of morality. 196 Pogge refers to TRIPS as a 'notorious' Agreement, which had globalised a monopoly patent regime, which keeps the prices of advanced medicines much higher than the long-run cost of production by suppressing generic competition. He also argues that this excludes the global poor from access to Concerning access, patents are not the issue but the overwhelming poverty of individuals, absence of state healthcare financing, lack of medical personnel, transport and distribution infrastructure plus supply chain charges which can make affordable originator or generic products unaffordable. In many countries, medicines are unaffordable from whatever source, price or patent status.
vital medicines for the sake of enhancing the incentives to develop new medicines for the affluent.
197 It should not be forgotten that under international human rights laws, the right to health includes elements related to health care -which includes access to medicines, curative and preventive health care, and other aspects related to a number of 'underlying preconditions for health '. 198 In this regard, the CESCR interpreted the understanding of the 'highest attainable standard of health' as 'a right to the enjoyment of a variety of facilities, good, services and conditions necessary for the realisation of the highest attainable standard of health', 199 and access to necessary medicines should be understood in the light of this explanation. This would mean that the 'Right to Highest Attainable Standard of Health' should include the of 'provision of equal and timely access to basic preventive, curative, rehabilitative health services and health education; … ; appropriate treatment of prevalent diseases, illness, injuries and disabilities; the provision of essential drugs; and … ' 200 In this sense, medicines, as a basic means for the guarantee of people's enjoyment of health should be made available to ensure the realisation of the right to health and implies that the right to health encompasses a minimum and universal right to affordable essential medicines. 201 It can be argued that the developing countries and LDCs had their chance to put their cases across when the TRIPS Agreement was negotiated in the Uruguay Round of negotiations prior to its entry in 1995, and that the negative effect of the TRIPS Agreement, if any on access to medicines, was addressed by the TRIPS Council and offset through the Doha Declaration made in 2001. Unfortunately, this argument is not sustainable, as a level playing field was glaringly absent during the Uruguay Round of negotiations (a factor discussed earlier in this article), which effectively gave away the advantage to the advocates of an international IP rights protection regime. The negotiation and entry of TRIPs in 1995 empowered a particular group of actors, namely developed countries led by the USA, to successfully embed their preferred way of governing IP rights in the TRIPs agreement. 202 Pogge argues that the Agreement cannot be just and highlights the fact that representatives of a number of acceding governments included individuals such as Suharto (Indonesia), Mugabe (Zimbabwe), Sani Abacha (Nigeria), Mobutu Sese Seko (Democratic Republic of Congo), and Burma's SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council) junta, who could not have represented the best interests of the people they were ruling. 203 Supporting Pogge, one can argue that large democracies like India, Brazil, South Africa, etc., represented by democratically elected governments, opposed the very entry of patent protection into the WTO on the grounds that the right place for matters relating to IP rights protection was the WIPO, while also warning that it could cause serious harm to the populations residing in developing countries and LDCs in their access to affordable medicines. The developing countries were in for a rude shock, when the negotiated trade-off agreed with the developed countries to sign the TRIPS Agreement did not materialise. 204 Pogge also argues that by globalising the pharmaceutical patent regime the advanced nations have imposed a very costly loss of freedom on the global poor, thereby cutting off poor patients from their generic drug supply and exposing billions of vulnerable people to heightened risk of death and disease. 205 Stiglitz observes that while he was serving in the Council of Economic Advisors under the Clinton Administration, it was 'clear that there was more interest in pleasing the pharmaceutical and entertainment industries than in ensuring an IP regime that was good for science, let alone for developing countries'. 206 He also notes that the trade negotiators who framed the IP agreement of the Uruguay Round of negotiations in the early 1990s were 'either unaware of all this, or more likely, uninterested'. 207 These shocking observations shed light on the general mood prevalent at the highest level of trade negotiation, where the framers were totally unaware of such problems of access to medicines, and also not so keen in discussing such issues. Several investigations carried out in the pre-WTO era had clearly demonstrated that the protection of IP right is disproportionately more important to the chemical and pharmaceutical industries. 208 It is obvious that at the root of the TRIPS Agreement lies the persistent tension between the economic powerhouses that seek to commodify and appropriate more intellectual goods into the private property realm and those who seek the dissemination of such intellectual goods into the 'intangible commons' for public use and the protection of the public domain more generally. 209 The TRIPS Agreement and its imposition are plainly unjust and will, in terms of the magnitude of harm caused, top the ratings of the largest human rights violations in history.
A discussion on access to essential medicines will not be complete without mentioning the role of FTAs, multilateral agreements, and TRIPS-plus provisions, which have caused serious harm and also posed fresh problems. The threat to access to medicines, both actual and perceived, does not stop with the introduction of multilateral agreements which were instrumental in the introduction of a higher international IP rights protection, but continues to grow with the forging of FTAs and other multilateral agreements. These agreements cannot now be seen as a mere 'threat', as they have clearly evolved to become concrete barriers to the access to affordable medicines in developing countries and LDCs. The only international organisation where such matters can now be debated is the WTO, which administers the TRIPS Agreement and other covered agreements of the multilateral trading system. The WTO, needless to say, does not have any control over the FTAs nor other multilateral agreements affecting access to medicines in developing countries and LDCs. In this regard, the loss of WIPO's governance over the administration of international IP rights protection is lamentable, and the actions of the developed countries in moving the governance from the WIPO to the WTO in the late 1980s can only be seen as a calculated move to serve the interest of 'rights owning' countries. To some degree it can also be asserted that the developing countries and the LDCs have been traded off to benefit the IP right holders. The US strategy on such matters has always been to directly influence and constrain the pharmaceutical coverage programmes of its trading partners.
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There is also a strong view that an 'informal empire' has been built on a legal framework by the developed countries, particularly the USA, by virtue of their obvious economic supremacy, by dictating the terms of international legal rules and also at the same time interpreting the said rules in a form suitable to their own interests without any realistic challenge.
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If the TRIPS Agreement was a well-concerted effort by the developed countries and their transnational pharmaceutical corporations, then, the TRIPS Agreement flexibilities and the Doha Declaration were a hard fought bargain by the developing countries, LDCs, and NGOs. One of the main concerns for some of the developing countries during the negotiations was the requirement of a sudden transition from a process patent regime to a product patent regime. The TRIPS Flexibilities were built into the TRIPS Agreement to benefit the developing countries and LDCs while implementing the Agreement into their national laws. This was intended to take away the strain of imposing a higher IP rights regime upon jurisdictions which were not fully prepared to embrace a much higher standard than the one in place in the domestic legislation. As discussed earlier, the TRIPS flexibilities afforded a delayed implementation, the use of compulsory licensing, etc., but in actual practice it had been extremely difficult, or even impossible, for the developing countries to implement. A combination of factors, namely the TRIPS-plus provisions introduced through FTAs, political pressure from developed countries through trade sanctions, and pressure from transnational pharmaceutical companies -either through protracted court proceedings, and or lobbying, have robbed the developing countries and the LDCs from exercising their rights under the TRIPS Agreement. It can be argued that pharmaceutical patent-holding developed countries have used the TRIPS Agreement to set a benchmark on IP standards and have exploited the loopholes in the multilateral trading system, which allows for regional trade agreements (RTAs), to effectively prevent the developing countries from implementing the TRIPS flexibilities.
3.1.5. Implementation of Paragraph 6 and the proposal for amendments It would be pertinent here to discuss the implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration and the proposed amendments to the Agreement made in 2005. Many developing countries and LDCs do not have the manufacturing capacity and, or the economic viability to either produce active ingredients, or formulations, and hence cannot avail the provision of 'compulsory licenses' under the TRIPS Agreement. Also, the option of importing generic medicines from other countries is restricted in the Agreement which requires production under compulsory licence to be predominantly for the supply of the domestic market. Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration reads as follows: 'WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.' Recognising the problem, the Doha Declaration directed the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution and to report back to the General With almost a year to go, only 53 Member States (as of 19 January 2015) have desired an amendment of the Agreement. 217 This in itself is a worrying development, as a number of developing countries and LDCs who are being affected, and will be affected even more in the coming months and years, have not expressed their wish for an amendment to the Agreement. Given the fact that what is sought to be made permanent is the temporary waiver brought under Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, which will pave the way for exporting and importing generic drugs under the compulsory licensing provision of the TRIPS Agreement. It is a real concern that there is very little engagement in this regard from the developing countries and LDCs. This clearly demonstrates, not an indifference towards the issue but, an ignorance of the magnitude of the problem that the TRIPS Agreement had brought about in the access to medicines in the developing countries and LDCs. This takes us back to a point made earlier -if there had been a level playing field at the Uruguay Round of negotiations when the TRIPS was taken up for discussions; and all the Ministerial representatives at the GATT conversant and aware of the shortcoming of the proposal that was being negotiated, there would not have been an agreement on an enlarged international IP rights protection regime through the WTO. Most of the subSaharan African countries suffer due to lack of access to medicines, but a mere 6 Member States have expressed their desire for an amendment. 218 Sadly, a majority of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa rely on generic drugs for treatment and do not possess the necessary infrastructure to manufacture any generic drugs that they need for frontline treatment. Africa as a continent will stand to benefit through a full support of the amendment to the TRIPS Agreement from its WTO Member States. It is yet to be seen if the 31 December 2015 deadline will come to pass, or if the proposed amendment, as in the past, will get another extension.
3.1.6. Transnational pharmaceutical corporations and the right to life-saving medicines From the foregoing discussion one can conclude that the key player behind the creation of a global IP rights protection was the transnational pharmaceutical corporations who hold patent rights to pharmaceutical patents for the medicines required in the treatment of diseases in the world. Importantly, the consumers of patented pharmaceutical goods are spread all over the world, and more so in the developing countries and LDCs. Patients in developing countries and LDCs suffer most from the impact of the TRIPS Agreement, as the implementation has seen the price of patented drugs rise exponentially within a very short time, defying any logic. This situation has resulted in medicines becoming unaffordable and beyond the reach of even governmental agencies in developing countries and LDCs. As mentioned earlier, the most affected patients of the HIV/AIDS pandemic come from developing countries or LDCs where frontline treatment is unaffordable due to the above factor. Stiglitz argues that one of the reasons for high costs of medicines ' … is that the patent system impedes access to lifesaving drugs for billions'. 219 Stiglitz also argues that one of the main reasons the transnational pharmaceutical industry was 217 pushing for TRIPS was that they wanted to reduce access to generic medicines, as the prices of generic drugs are very low and are favoured over the much higher priced patented drugs. 220 And also, any competition with the generics drugs will drive down the price of the brand name drugs. Stiglitz observes that the lower prices in turn lowers the profits of the brand name pharmaceutical companies, and that it is understandable why the transnational pharmaceutical corporations pushed so hard and also contributed for international IP rights protection.
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Patients in developed countries do not face a similar fate, as they boast of a well-defined health-care system, where medicines are affordable (through prescriptions), and also medical treatment is well regulated by their respective governments. The same cannot be said about any of the developing countries or LDCs. The voice from the developing countries that we hear is not for free medicine but for the access to affordable medicines. It should be seen as the failure of the WTO to develop an adequate solution to the AIDS issue which is emblematic of a broader truth about global IP rights and the developing world. 222 To a greater degree, the WTO, as an agency of the UN and the world governing body that administers the TRIPS Agreement, should be made accountable for its failure in not finding an effective solution to access to medicines in most of its Member States, and more particularly in developing countries and LDCs, where patent protection is compulsorily extended to pharmaceutical products through the TRIPS Agreement. The argument that Doha Declaration was especially formulated to address this issue, and that flexibilities were built into the TRIPS Agreement to address the specific issue cannot be sustained, as they have proved to be ineffective in most cases. As Stiglitz observes, the transnational pharmaceutical corporations and FTAs have made the grant of compulsory licences difficult. He further argues that 'had the intention been to retain access to life-saving generic medicines for developing countries, TRIPS would have provided for an automatic right to issue compulsory licenses for expensive, life-saving medicines'. 223 In his opinion when the trade ministers signed the TRIPS Agreement ' … in the spring of 1994, they were in effect signing the death warrants on thousands of people in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere in the developing countries'. 224 Sherry Marcellin notes that the making of the patent provision under the TRIPS Agreement represents an instance of institutional capture by private interests, dominated by American industry. 225 A thorough study of the actual investment into R&D, marketing, and the cost of patented drugs offered for sale by transnational pharmaceutical corporations in developing countries is to be undertaken to have a clear picture of the cost-benefit ratio of the research, investment, the cost of production and benefit derived by the end user. This again is subject to data being made available by the transnational pharmaceutical corporations. Worryingly, there is a lack of transparency in the pharmaceutical business sector, and also the fact that transnational pharmaceutical corporations take advantage of the loopholes in the international legal system to conceal valuable data from public scrutiny makes it harder for a study. Any report available from such a study will have the potential to challenge the argument of 'patents encourage innovation in the medical sector' used to justify the pharmaceutical corporations. Pharmaceutical industry representatives have long defended patents rights as the 'lifeblood of our industry -we literally could not exist without them'. 226 Given the great importance the transnational pharmaceutical sector places on patents, it is not surprising that it stands alone in its involvement with the patent system and also has done much to ensure that the system meets its requirements. 227 According to Lipton, the patent-driven approach in the pharmaceutical industry has been linked to health-care access in developing countries in that the costs of pharmaceutical products, directly or indirectly increase the national budget of developing countries for medicines ' … and constitute a hindrance to the effective provision of health care by public authorities'. 228 Some have even argued that since disease impairs normal human functioning, it restricts a person's range of opportunities to pursue a career, and that by preventing, curing, or ameliorating disease, therefore, adequate health care helps to guarantee fair equality of opportunity. 229 Most importantly, the current commercial patent model as practised by the pharmaceutical industry results in a gross inadequacy of appropriate R&D for medicines and vaccines required to tackle diseases that may be peculiar to developing countries. 230 Stiglitz and Jayadev argue that the major problem with the current private property model of patenting prohibiting the existence of rival products without the permission of the patent right holder is that it can act as a barrier to knowledge and slow down the pace of new and socially desirable discoveries. 231 This observation defeats the argument for extending pharmaceutical patent protection in developing countries and LDCs as very little R&D is carried out by transnational pharmaceutical corporations into diseases prevalent in developing countries and LDCs.
Patent-holding transnational pharmaceutical corporations are viewed as complex organisations which exceed their goals and functions, but in non-utilitarian ways. 232 Umahi and Osuji observe that transnational pharmaceutical corporations are seen as a major impediment to access to essential life-saving medicines in developing countries. 233 In their view, Article 27 234 of the TRIPS Agreement lays down a very wide primary provision that creates exclusive rights affecting virtually every aspect of the availability and affordability of medicines. As observed by Justice Jacobs, such exclusive rights prop 'an arms race in which the weapons are patents'. 235 A judicial observation from Justice Jacobs in the above lines is a damnifying verdict on the global patent system. In Umahi and Osuji's opinion, it is a race which developing countries lack the capacity to compete in effectively, as they try to protect the interests of the consumers of pharmaceutical processes and products. The authors propose as a way forward the creation of an effective access to medicines corporate social responsibility (CSR) 236 framework for pharmaceutical companies which could include pricing, patents, testing and clinical trials, R&D, joint public private initiative, and appropriate use of drugs. They also argue that the CSR of multinational pharmaceutical companies in developing countries should reflect context, opportunity, proximity, time, and impact in accordance with the social integration and ethical approaches to CSR. 237 These suggestions go a long way in approaching the inequalities created by the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. Sadly, what we are witnessing is a modern-day David and Goliath situation, where diminutive David is losing out fast against the patent-holding pharmaceutical giant, Goliath.
Part 4 4.1. Findings
The neoclassical worldview that what is good for business is also good for the society is not sustainable, as the economic foundations of the patent system, or the justification for a monopoly protection for private rights at the cost of public good and human rights is ill-founded. Jagdish Bhagwati, the renowned economist and an advocate of free trade, argues that the TRIPS Agreement does not belong in the WTO, as it enforces payment by the poor countries (consumers) to the rich countries (IP producers), and that by introducing the TRIPS through the WTO 'we legitimated the WTO to extract royalty payments'. 238 Bhagwati, declaring support for the NGO statement 'asking for the IP leg of the WTO to be sawn off', also observed that the WTO must be about mutual gains in trade, whereas IP protection, introduced through the TRIPS Agreement, is a tax on poor countries, constituting a wealth transfer to the rich countries, that has turned the WTO into a royalty-collection agency. 239 As observed by Stiglitz, the importance of IP rights is exaggerated, and they form only one part of our innovation system, and that they should be seen 'as part of a Article 65, Paragraph 8 of Article 70 and Paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology, and whether products are imported or locally produced. 235 portfolio of instruments'. 240 Stiglitz further argues that there is an immediate need to strengthen the other elements of this portfolio and redesign the current IP regime to increase its benefits and reduce its costs. Martin Khor, while advocating for a review of the TRIPS Agreement, argues that the agenda should include the 'question of its removal from the WTO so that the trade organisation can return to its mission of promoting balanced trade options'. 241 Earlier in the discussion, it was noted how transnational corporations led by patentholding pharmaceutical corporations, and ably backed by developed countries successfully shifted the forum for international IP rights protection from the WIPO to the WTO during the Uruguay Round of negotiations. Not stopping with the shift in the forum, as argued by Marcellin, 242 the patent-holding pharmaceutical corporations through the developed country representation have resorted to an 'institutional capture', which in effect had resulted in a stalemate with no possibility of a renegotiation of the TRIPS Agreement at the WTO. Not only have the transnational patent-holding corporations been successful in shifting the forum from the WIPO to the WTO and in the eventual creation of the TRIPS Agreement, but also in taking absolute control of the administering body through the developed country Member States. In the foregoing paragraphs we discussed the access to medicines/public health implications of an enforced international IP rights protection regime on the Member States of the WTO, and also there being no real consensus as to the impact of patent protection on the growth of technology. 243 Instead of engaging in a debate if the IP rights protection will lead to increased innovation and foreign investment in developing countries, 244 or if current drug prices are justified by the need for future R&D, 245 it would be hugely beneficial to engage in a serious study of the harms of an expanded international IP rights protection on global public health concerns as a human right. The need of the hour is a thorough examination of the philosophical foundations for an international IP rights vis-à-vis that of the foundations to public right to health, as the utilitarian basis of IP rights protection seem to completely neglect the rights of the individual to the enjoyment of the public good.
Discussion and conclusion
The economic analysis of IP laws is inconclusive as regards their benefit to society, as there is a division in the perception of what is public good, and if IP would constitute a public good. From the above discussion, it emerges that the current international IP regime, which is modelled on the US IP laws, and as promoted by the WTO through the TRIPS Agreement, has caused and continues to cause enormous difficulties for the developing countries and LDCs through its implementation. The TRIPS Agreement's implementation has also helped the pharmaceutical corporations to create a false demand and increase the price of patented pharmaceutical products. This raises the question if the international IP regime's economic justification to society's welfare has been overstated and overshadows the harm it causes to societies in developed countries and LDCs. What is clear though is that under the current regime information is patentable (also heavily patented), and comes at a very high price, and consumers have to pay tax and royalty to the developed countries on everything one consumes on a daily basis. Information is knowledge, and it does not come free but at a high price. This leads us to the question, if it was at all necessary for the WTO to move towards a global product patent regime in the first place? As discussed earlier, the idea or, more precisely the template was mooted by transnational pharmaceutical corporations ably backed by other patent-holding corporations and developed countries to move towards a product patent regime. This model was designed to create a two-tier system, which comprises the patent holders and consumers among the WTO Member States, where the globally spread consumers (mostly located in developing countries and LDCs) pay a royalty to the patent holders based in developed countries. The TRIPS regime also effectively outlaws the generic drugs industry through the introduction of a product patent system, which had been the mainstay for developing countries and LDCs, offering access to affordable medicine for their health-care needs. It is well documented that transnational pharmaceutical corporations have hindered the movement of generic drugs through the misuse of EU regulations in the past, 246 although there was nothing to prove that the generic drugs transported violated any existing patent laws. In the post-TRIPS era, the transnational pharmaceutical corporations have challenged such TRIPS compliant legislations sought to be implemented in developing countries (through the backing of developed countries), which they view as being harmful to their business interests. 247 These actions were resorted to both before the respective domestic courts in the developing countries and before the WTO through developed country representation. These tactics have resulted in delaying the introduction of TRIPS compliant patent legislation or, thwarting the introduction of suitable legislation for growth and for implementation of health-care policies in the developing countries.
The argument that IP rights are important for the society will become unacceptable if the right to access to affordable medicine is not addressed by the WTO immediately. Soon, the LDCs too will be required to implement the TRIPS Agreement, thereby presenting a much more acute problem than what is being faced at the moment. The model of multilateral trade promoted and practised under the WTO through the covered agreements is such that it does not allow the WTO to either contain or to respond quickly to any social inequalities created by the operation of the covered agreements. This is well demonstrated by the fact that the WTO has no control over transnational pharmaceutical corporations, which have the developed countries as their mouthpiece, or over developed countries that enter into FTAs with strong TRIPS-plus provisions. Further, it is not possible for the WTO to check the proliferation of FTAs and RTAs, as they are not prohibited under the GATT, but the Member States are only obligated to declare/notify the creation of RTAs. The developing countries are caught between a rock and a hard place in their struggle to gain access to affordable medicine. What we witness is an international organisation, whose institution is not capable of addressing issues of urgent and absolute importance on a war footing. Although the above study focuses more on the problems surrounding pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines, the conclusions that one is tempted to draw are that the current global IP regime as designed and introduced under the TRIPS Agreement is only capable of benefitting the patent-holding developed Member States of the WTO and be of great disadvantage to the non-patent-holding developing country and LDC Member States of the WTO.
What one has to note is that IP rights through its close association with the growth of technology and the media holds a popular position and has been glamorised by its proponents. Unfortunately, human rights and related issues do not enjoy the same luxury that IP rights enjoy. Human rights have come to be associated with images of the poor and suffering in the third world, and may not have the same glamour or public appeal as IP rights. The topic of HIV/AIDS is not anymore headline news in developed countries, as it is treatable and manageable with frontline ARVs, but in sharp contrast it is a day-to-day problem in developing countries and LDCs where access to frontline ARV treatment is unaffordable as the pharmaceutical patents are held by transnational pharmaceutical corporations from one of the developed countries. It should be borne in mind that the losses that developing countries and LDCs suffer as a result of the international IP rights protection do not stop with access to affordable medicines, but include issues such as access to cultural and educational material, patented seeds and food products, protection of traditional knowledge and indigenous materials, computer software, and knowledge per se. As Professor Peter Yu notes, the difference between lack of access to medicines and the lack of access to cultural and educational materials is 'like the difference between dying now and dying slowly later'. 248 On the aforementioned discussions and on the strength of available evidence, it is high time for a complete rethink on the TRIPS Agreement as a covered agreement of the WTO, if not as an immediate measure to remove its application to pharmaceutical patents. In the absence of a positive action on the part of the WTO to revise the TRIPS Agreement, or in the alternative to remove pharmaceutical patent protection from the ambit of TRIPS, as a way forward, the BRIC countries comprising of Brazil, Russia, India and China, the LDCs and similar interest groups should form working groups/ FTAs to promote and safeguard their interests.
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